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In Defence of the Alterfactual in Historical Analysis 
 
In recent years a small number of so-called ‘counterfactual’ or ‘what-if’ historical books, 
which ask us to imagine what would have happened if events in the past had turned out 
differently than they did, have been published. They have stimulated an important, albeit 
not entirely new, methodological debate about issues and questions which are (or should 
be) of central relevance to the work of socialist historians, and which such historians need 
to engage with and contribute towards. This brief discussion article attempts to do this by 
presenting one particular Marxist viewpoint, with the hope and expectation others 
(hopefully supportive but possibly critical of the argument presented here) will follow. In 
the process, it examines the past use (and abuse) of the counterfactual within historical 
analysis, presents an argument for the validity of a refined and renamed ‘alterfactual’ 
approach, and examines the use of such an alterfactual approach to the British miners’ 
strike of 1984-5. 
 
In the past a variety of different well-known historians, including Edward Gibbon, Isaiah 
Berlin, and G. M. Trevelyan, have ventured to address (or at least to pose) counterfactual 
questions, But one of the most important recent publications within the ‘what-if’ genre is 
a book edited by right-wing Oxford University historian Niall Ferguson entitled Virtual 
History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals, originally published in 1997 and republished 
in paperback in 2003.1
 
 The book contains a series of contributions from different leading 
historians (many of whom are also right-wing) exploring what might have happened if 
nine momentous events (mostly twentieth-century turning points) had turned out 
differently. What if Charles I had avoided the Civil War? What if there had been no 
American Revolution? What if Home Rule had been enacted in 1912? What if Britain 
had ‘stood aside’ in August 1914? What if Germany had invaded Britain in May 1940? 
What if Nazi Germany had defeated the Soviet Union? What if the Cold War had been 
avoided? What if J. F. Kennedy had lived? What if Communism had not collapsed? As 
well as contributing one of these essays (on August 1914), Ferguson provides an 
overview of some of the debates over the last three hundred and fifty years related to the 
practice of what he terms ‘virtual history’.  
Similar counterfactual books have also appeared recently. In the book What Might Have 
Been (2004), Andrew Roberts from Cambridge University, brings together a collection of 
twelve short essays written by leading (again mainly right-wing) historians (such as John 
Adamson, Norman Stone, Antonio Fraser and Simon Heffer) to pose other ‘what-ifs’ of 
history.2
 
  Examples include: What if the Spanish Armada landed in England? What if the 
Gunpowder Plot succeeded? What if Great Britain won the American War of 
Independence? What if Archduke Franz Ferdinand survived Sarajevo? What if Lenin was 
assassinated at the Finland Station? What if Stalin fled Moscow in 1941? What if the 
Brighton bomb killed Margaret Thatcher? In addition, David Frum, a former 
speechwriter and special assistant to President George W. Bush, wonders what if Al Gore 
had won the 2000 American presidential election (I thought he did). 
Meanwhile, the military historian Robert Cowley has also edited three counterfactual 
books, with the most recent, What If? America (2005), also bringing together a collection 
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of essays written by ‘eminent historians’, this time concerned with potential alternative 
events in American history.3
 
 On the basis that there is no such thing as historical 
inevitability, most contributors attempt to remind us of the role of chance and accident in 
human affairs, ironically in which illness and weather seem to dominate proceedings. For 
example: What if the storm-force winds had not blown the Mayflower north to Cape Cod? 
What if George Washington’s army had not escaped from Brooklyn Heights behind a 
convenient layer of fog? If the sensible Pitt the Elder had not fallen ill, might he have 
negotiated for America to remain within a reformed British empire? In addition, the 
distinguished war historian Antony Beevor wonders whether Eisenhower’s troops might 
have seized Berlin before Stalin, thereby severely delaying the Soviet atomic programme. 
Such alternative histories have not only been penned by academics. One of the towering 
novels of 2004, The Plot Against America by Phillip Roth, imagines a what-if fascist 
America, where aviator and Hitler-admirer Charles Lindbergh beats Roosevelt to the 
White House in 1940.  
 
Not surprisingly, although such counterfactual history has been very well received by 
right-wing historians, as well as by newspapers such as the Daily Mail, in a short 
comment piece in The Guardian the leftish historian Tristram Hunt castigated this kind of 
work, in which: 
 
…there is as much a sense of ‘if only’ as ‘what if’. This is history as wishful 
thinking, providing little insight into the decision-making processes of the past, 
but pointing up preferable alternatives and lamenting their failure to come to 
pass.4
 
 
Hunt highlights the way in which many ‘what-if’ authors, such as Niall Ferguson, pursue 
a conservative political agenda that explicitly rejects Marxist history (mistakenly 
perceived as being completely determinist) with the ultimate aim of elevating certain 
powerful individuals (usually generals and politicians) to the heart of their histories. In 
the process, there is often a relative neglect of the structures, processes and limitations 
that social context can place on the historical role of the individual.  
 
Significantly, this critique of the counterfactual in historical research has long been 
common among many historians. For example, E. H. Carr dismissed such exercises as a 
mere ‘parlour game’, a ‘red herring’.5 From Carr’s point of view there are literally no two 
ways about it, and questions beginning ‘What If?’ are simply not worth asking. ‘History 
is…a record of what people did, and not what they failed to do…The historian is 
concerned with those who…achieved something’.6 Characteristically E. P. Thompson 
went one stage further, dismissing ‘counterfactual fictions’ as ‘unhistorical shit’.7
 
 Both 
pointed to the futility of pondering multiple variables in the past and the logical problem 
of assuming all other conditions remained constant.  
However arguably, none of the criticisms which have been hitherto leveled at the 
counterfactual approach necessarily invalidate a methodological form of inquiry that 
recognizes the way in which every historical situation contains potential ‘what ifs’. It 
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does not undermine the value of conceiving of ways in which the actual course of past 
events might have unfolded rather differently if various actors had acted and organized 
themselves differently, armed with a different set of capacities and ideas, even if their 
exact effect cannot be predicted. This is something which is particularly the case not only 
at times of war (in relation to questions of military strategy) but also during great labour 
conflict and social revolution. In terms of its general value Hugh Trevor-Roper has 
commented: 
 
At any given moment there are real alternatives…How can we explain what happened and why if 
we only look at what happened and never consider the alternatives…It is only if we place 
ourselves before the alternatives of the past…only if we live for a moment, as the men of the time 
lived, in its still fluid context and among its still unresolved problems, if we see those problems 
coming upon us…that we can draw useful lessons from history.8
 
 
But even if examination of what did not happen historically is of value, there are, of 
course, very real problems with much of the counterfactual history that has been 
produced in the past, particularly in recent years. At this point it is useful to look at the 
three main limitations of the counterfactual technique in order to posit the possibility of a 
rather more grounded and methodologically valid approach. 
 
The most frequently raised objection to the counterfactual approach is that it depends on 
‘facts which never existed’. It is, critics argue, a technique based on mere fantasy or what 
Simon Schama calls ‘fairy stories’. Such speculation, it is suggested, is mere 
entertainment; it is mind games lacking in intellectual rigour or seriousness. Hence, we 
simply lack the empirical evidence, the knowledge, to answer counterfactual questions.  
 
Undoubtedly this is a charge which is often justified (despite suggestions made otherwise 
by Niall Ferguson and others) about much of the recent material we have considered. 
Indeed, the claim that ‘what-if’ history writing is acceptable so long as it is as ‘believable 
as possible’ does not really hold up when the only constraint most writers appear to 
impose is merely that potential scenarios are viewed as being ‘plausible’.9
 
  On this very 
loosely framed basis, while it would clearly be impermissible for Lenin say, to have a 
nuclear bomb, it is nonetheless viewed as acceptable for speculation about what might 
have happened if the bombs had fused at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In practice, for many 
practioneers of the counterfactual approach almost anything (including events that have 
no connection with conscious human intervention whatsoever) can be included in the 
‘virtual history’ that is conjured up. In the process, most tend to discredit themselves by 
posing, what are in reality, implausible questions or by providing implausible answers. 
And those historians who favour a postmodern world of contingency for whom one 
narrative is as valid as another, inevitably end up with the complete blurring of factual, 
counter-factual and fiction.  
However, this lack of empirical evidence need not always be so. One of the better recent 
attempts to consider an alternative course of events to that which occurred has been 
provided in the book 1943: The Victory That Never Was by John Grigg, a (by no means 
left-wing) freelance journalist.10 The thesis of the book is that the Western Allies could 
and should have invaded France in 1943, rather than in 1944, which would probably have 
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shortened the Second World War, certainly spared many lives and possibly have altered 
the course of the subsequent Cold War. Grigg brings a forensic judgment to bear on 
events and decisions so often regarded as almost inevitable. He convincingly does so not 
just by criticizing the actions of Roosevelt and Churchill and the brutality of Harris’s 
bombing policy, but also by dismissing the main counter-arguments to the view that the 
cross-Channel invasion should have been a year earlier. But what stands out about this 
account is the way that Grigg utilizes the empirical information and factual arguments 
that were available (and in part considered) at the time, rather than lapsing into mere 
wishful speculation or fantasy.11
 
 Moreover, the analysis of what could have happened 
helps to provide a more thorough contextual explanation of what did happen. 
A second objection to counterfactual history is that, in speculating about potential 
alternative decisions made by great military and political leaders such as, for example, 
Napoleon or Churchill, it rips individual human actors from the limitations of their social 
context and thereby makes the exercise even more pointless and unbelievable. Again, 
there is evidence to suggest much recent work commits precisely this error. As Marx 
argued: ‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do 
not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly 
encountered, given, and transmitted from the past’.12
 
 In these counterfactual scenarios, by 
contrast, we are often led to believe that powerful individuals, ‘great men’ in history, are 
free of almost all historical constraints, able to make decisions purely on their own 
volition.  
Yet this emphasis on agency, to the subordination of structure, while common to most 
counterfactual work hitherto produced (and is not uncommon in more orthodox historical 
accounts), is also not necessarily an integral part of any attempt to inquire into potential 
alternative historical events. It is, or should be, possible for the researcher to integrate the 
interaction between individual choices and historical context; recognizing that while 
human action itself constitutes and in some circumstances transforms social structures, 
social structures contain and condition what can be achieved through individual or 
collective human action. Certainly, Grigg’s work, mentioned above, succeeds admirably 
in achieving this interface. 
 
A third objection to counterfactual history is that, as Ferguson has suggested, far from 
being a harmless intellectual pursuit, it pushes a dangerous historical and right-wing 
political agenda. Once again, such a critique appears well founded both in terms of the 
political vantage point of most (albeit not all) recent writers and the potential alternative 
events on which they (or most) speculate. Certainly, it is no coincidence that the most 
recurring counterfactual is the indulgent dream of: What if Charles I had won, or avoided, 
the Civil War? And not surprisingly for those preoccupied with military strategy and 
tactics, no conflict has been more heavily subjected to counterfactual analysis than the 
Second World War. One publisher, Greenhill Books, even has a special section of its lists 
devoted to various different outcomes of that war. In the process, it is not difficult to 
discern the straying from ‘what-if’ to the judgmental ‘if-only’ by armchair ‘would-be’ 
generals. 
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Moreover, the way in which Ferguson has (elsewhere) posed the counterfactual question: 
‘Would British colonies have achieved more peace and prosperity in the absence of 
British rule?’ effectively justify the benign effect of British empire, built on genocide and 
slavery, has also not exactly encouraged a sympathetic approach to the historical 
method.13 The same could be said for R.W. Fogel, who in asking whether the United 
States’ economy could have thrived in the nineteenth century without railways, has gone 
on to argue that slavery would have survived as a perfectly viable economic system if it 
had not been eradicated by the Civil War.14
 
  
Nonetheless, such an explicit right-wing political agenda is not always apparent in 
counterfactual history, and anyway is by no means an integral part of any attempt to 
inquire into potential alternative courses of events to those that occurred in historical 
analysis.  
 
Of course, there is a danger of historians, with the benefit of historical hindsight, 
superimposing their own, often politically-informed, preferred alternative options on past 
events. Roger Seifert and Tom Sibley have insisted in the (2005) book United They Stood: 
The Story of the UK Firefighters’ Dispute 2002-2004: 
 
The point of writing history is to make sure that the actions and views of those involved are 
reported as they were at the time of the decisions and not re-invented afterwards. Pointless 
speculation – counterfactual history – about the what-ifs of life serve no purpose other than to 
undermine the decision capabilities of those involved. 15
 
 
But ironically even such left-wing authors as Seifert and Sibley (who are supporters of 
the Communist Party of Britain/Morning Star) are not immune from the dangers of 
advancing a political agenda, even by omission.16
 
 Significantly, their book received the 
official endorsement of the Fire Brigades Union general secretary (at the time) Andy 
Gilchrist and the union’s national executive, presenting what is effectively a semi-official 
‘authorised’ history from above viewed through the eyes of national union officers. In the 
process, it defensively seeks to justify the ‘flexible strategy’ of discontinuous strike 
action adopted, with its repeated suspension and cancellation of strike days, as the most 
appropriate means of obtaining a negotiated settlement in difficult circumstances, and 
claims it succeeded in achieving a tactical, though limited, victory. The authors 
vigorously seek to denigrate so-called ‘ultra-left’ groups (which became the focus for a 
growing internal union opposition to the leadership during the dispute and afterwards by 
calling into question the strategy employed, campaigning for the escalation of action, and 
bitterly criticising the final agreement) for allegedly being completely unrepresentative of 
the mass of members.  
But readers are not provided with the available alternative arguments or evidence that 
might contradict the author’s claims, which at the very least would have helped too 
contextualise and explain the growing disenchantment about the direction and outcome of 
the dispute that became evident at grassroots level. Such dissent was most spectacularly 
demonstrated by the overwhelming rejection of the executive council’s recommendation 
to accept an employers’ offer at the March 2003 recall national delegate conference and 
the historically momentous decision taken at the June 2004 annual conference to reject 
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executive council advice and disaffiliate from the Labour Party (both of which are 
relegated to less than half a page by Seifert and Sibley). Even if a more adversarial union 
campaign may not necessarily have led to a more favourable outcome, many activists 
clearly thought otherwise, and the potential effect of an alternative more militant 
approach was something which would have been important to for historians to consider. 
 
Perhaps the most important point here is that whatever the political partisanship of the 
historian there should always be an attempt to write in as objective a way as possible (the 
two are not necessarily antagonistic to each other, although there are admittedly real 
tensions between them). It is undoubtedly of real significance when reading historical 
accounts and interpretations to be aware of an author’s political vantage point of analysis 
(something that should ideally be made explicit). But an equally important 
methodological issue is that there is no undue skewing of the ‘facts’ to suit the 
perspective of the author. And if this should be a guiding principle for historians in 
general then it should also apply to any consideration of potential alternative courses of 
events to those that actually occurred, not least given its inevitably broader ramifications 
for our understanding of what did take place. 
 
In other words then, what is being argued is that even if much of the counterfactual 
history practiced in the past has serious methodological limitations, this is not necessarily 
to suggest that any type of ‘what-if’ historical approach is equally bound to be flawed.  
 
At this point I want to propose a more appropriate term to illustrate the point, namely an 
‘alterfactual’ approach. As we have seen, the problem with the way the ‘counterfactual’ 
has often been used is that it suggests an essentially speculative and even anti-factual 
interest in the indeterminacy of the future - for example ‘What if Hitler had not come to 
power?’ By contrast, an alterfactual historical approach is one which is (or at least should 
be) based on the potential for alternative courses of action taken by actors which 
genuinely seemed possible at the time; it suggests an historical approach that frames its 
inquiry through the prism of a context that was shaped by the determinacy of events that 
actually happened - for example ‘Could Hitler have been stopped?’.  
 
On the basis of the above considerations I would suggest, from a Marxist point of view, 
that the posing of alterfactual courses of action in historical analysis is perfectly 
legitimate so long as the following methodological preconditions are applied:  
 
• only those alternative courses of action are considered which were theoretically or 
practically considered at the time by actors and for which there is some historical 
empirical evidence are valid 
 
• there is appropriate recognition of the complex dynamic interplay between 
(subjective) individual choices and (objective) historical material conditions  
 
• the political vantage point of the researcher is made explicit and the reader is 
invited to judge for themselves if there is any evidence of undue skewing of the 
available facts to suit the author’s perspective 
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• any historical inquiry into what might have happened can be shown to be directly 
related to providing a more comprehensive understanding and explanation of what 
actually happened. 
 
Whatever the term we use - Alan Fox has referred to ‘suppressed historical 
opportunities’17
  
-  if these four conditions are applied, I would suggest the posing of 
alterfactuals about what might have happened if alternative choices had been made and 
events had turned out differently can potentially enrich our understanding of the past. 
In fact, labour and socialist historians frequently discuss alternative courses of action 
available to historical actors; although they go on to explain why one course of action 
was chosen rather than another. In this way they often do not merely examine choices and 
events that happened and ask ‘why?’ - they also look at alternative choices and events 
that did not happen and ask ‘why not?’ One example of this can be briefly explored, 
namely the 1984-5 British miners’ strike. 
 
It is noticeable that in relation to this epic labour struggle some historians have adopted a 
limited alterfactual approach (although, of course, such a term is not used) in examining 
the impact of the decision made by the National Union of Miners (NUM) executive not to 
organize a national ballot from the outset of the dispute. While some commentators have 
assumed that a ballot would almost certainly have been unsuccessful, others18
 
 have 
argued that if such a ballot had been organized, accompanied by a broad political 
campaign to explain the reasons behind a coalfield strike, a majority vote in favour could 
have been won; this could have won the support of most Nottinghamshire miners and 
given the strike the greater political legitimacy that in turn could have led to a more 
successful outcome. Even though this is an alterfactual (rather than counterfactual) 
interpretation that can be challenged - as it was at the time – (see below) it is nonetheless 
an undoubtedly valid alternative course of action for historians to consider. 
Similar questions could be posed about other tactical decisions made in the 1984-5 
miners’ strike.19
 
 For example, it is possible to consider a potential alternative course of 
action to that which occurred in the first days of the strike. During this period the 
Yorkshire flying pickets that converged on the Nottingham coalfield were criticized by 
the Notts area NUM officials (with left-wing Notts area secretary Henry Richardson 
refusing to publicly dispute miners’ ‘right to work’ despite his appeals not to cross picket 
lines) and Yorkshire Area NUM officials ordered the withdrawal of the unofficial pickets 
to allow a Notts area ballot to take place. It is possible that if, from the onset of the strike 
and before the huge subsequent police operation that was mounted, striking miners had 
been provided the opportunity to explain their case face-to-face to working miners with 
the aim of trying to bring the pits out, the division that developed between Nottingham 
and the rest of the coalfields would not have been so fatal.  
Certainly, this tactic operated successfully in South Wales where the sanctity of the 
picket line proved crucial in overcoming the result of individual pithead ballots that had 
initially recorded opposition to strike action at eighteen of the area’s twenty-eight NUM 
lodges.20 And there is evidence to suggest that many rank-and-file striking Yorkshire 
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miners saw such a strategy as both crucial and potentially achievable. For example, one 
faceworker from Maltby colliery claimed that during the first week of the strike, the 
Yorkshire pickets received ‘95 per cent support’ from miners at Pye Hill colliery, while 
at Annesley, ‘we had them out’.21 By the third day of the strike, production in North 
Notts had been halted at eight collieries and reduced at the other six.22
 
 About 8,000 out of 
30,000 Notts miners were brought out through picketing that appealed for united action 
and it seems possible many more could have been if the argument that Notts miners had a 
direct interest in fighting to prevent future job losses had become more firmly implanted. 
However, initial successes proved short-lived in the face of official union opposition and 
the subsequently rapidly growing police presence. By the time a Notts miners’ delegate 
conference had finally declared the strike action engaged in by those in the area to be 
official, it was too late and the majority continued to work.  
Notwithstanding the assumption that the NUM’s failure to organize a national ballot was 
a ‘tactical mistake’ that inevitably undermined miners’ unity, and that a vote could 
actually have been won (a viewpoint held even by left-wing commentators such as Huw 
Beynon),23 there is much evidence to suggest that had a ballot been implemented it 
would merely have invited a ‘no’ vote and derailed the entire momentum of the strike 
movement. It should be noted that there were a number of crucial arguments advanced at 
the time against holding one - the failure to obtain a majority for action in earlier ballots 
in 1982 and 1983; the considerable initial success which pickets across the country had in 
spreading the strike suggested that their objectives could be achieved without recourse to 
a ballot; supporters of a ballot were generally opposed to the strike and knew the media 
would mount an unprecedented ‘No’ campaign ; there was no guarantee that Notts miners 
would join the strike, even if a national ballot had been held and a majority attained 
overall; no person should have the power to vote another out of a job.24
 
  Although a 
ballot is unlikely to have secured a favourable majority in Nottingham, it does seem 
reasonable to suggest that an active picketing strategy backed up with a propaganda 
offensive from the outset of the strike might have won a much larger network of support 
in the area, thereby considerably diminishing the damage to the strike that transpired.  
Another example of a potential alternative course of action relates to Orgreave, where -  
notwithstanding Scargill’s determined personal efforts to encourage a repeat of the 1972 
victory at Saltley Gates - NUM area officials (above all Jack Taylor, Yorkshire NUM 
president) and the union’s national executive refused to mount mass picketing aimed at 
turning ‘Orgreave into Saltley’. Although thousands of rank-and-file miners did take the 
initiative from below to converge onto the coking plant (which supplied the Scunthorpe 
steel plant), area union officials refused to call mass pickets for more than two 
consecutive days and rejected the attempt to build a consistent and prolonged 
mobilization of mass pickets, or to appeal for solidarity strike action or picket line 
support from the large concentrations of engineering and steelworkers based in nearby 
Sheffield and Rotherham, as was advocated by at least a small core of militant activists in 
the Yorkshire area.25
 
  
Again, it is possible that the adoption of such alternative tactics might have galvanized 
sufficient numbers (of hitherto more passive strikers as well as sympathetic local trade-
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unionists) to overcome the determination of the state to defeat mass picketing to 
successfully shut the plant down, which could have marked a symbolic political and 
psychological (albeit not necessarily industrial) turning point in the strike in a similar 
fashion to Saltley.26
 
 This in turn could have boosted the impetus to spread picketing out 
to other vulnerable areas. Instead, the uneven series of mass pickets that were held were 
unable to prevent the thousands of police officers equipped with riot helmets, shields, 
truncheons and horses at their flanks, inflicting some of the greatest violence seen in an 
industrial dispute since before the First World War. 
Of course, there were enormous potential objective constraints (such as the difficult 
economic environment, the extent of the state’s offensive, and the decline in the level of 
confidence generally inside the trade union movement) to the implementation of such 
alternative tactical initiatives that need to taken into consideration.27
 
 But these constraints 
by no means rendered such potential initiatives inoperable. Certainly, any historical 
inquiry about them is not to be compared to the traditional counterfactual historical 
approach based on pure wishful thinking, on speculation about decisions made by 
individual leading figures that run against the overall material context in a completely 
implausible fashion. On the contrary, these were potential initiatives that at least a 
minority of actors argued in favour of at the time and might have succeeded in 
implementing, despite the obstacles (from the employer, government, police, and other 
union members) they confronted. However, even if such initiatives had been taken, it is 
probably unlikely that the eventual outcome of the strike would have been a miners’ 
victory, although impossible to know. But it is a justifiable question to pose, not least 
because the lack of such tactical initiatives may, along with other factors, have actually 
contributed to the miners’ defeat.   
No doubt some people will dispute the validity of the alterfactual methodological 
approach adopted here as a pointless exercise; what happened in the past happened and 
no amount of alternative contemplation will change that or is worthwhile. But arguably 
the re-evaluation of any major historical event, and in particularly those that have 
involved workers’ battles against employers and governments, is a valuable exercise, not 
least because inquiring into what might have happened helps to provide a more 
comprehensive explanation of what actually happened. Beyond this, an alterfactual 
approach can also make a significant contribution to what might be regarded, by some at 
least, as another central purpose of history, namely to learn lessons for the future. In 
terms of the example we have examined this can either be specific (for instance, the 
efficacy of ballots and/or picketing in industrial disputes) or more general (for instance, 
the problematic nature of a divided union). If we accept such a purpose for studying 
history, then examining alternative course of action can be seen not as an attempt to 
rewrite history but an effort to either emulate or not to repeat it. At the very least, 
whatever the limitations of the counterfactual approach as practiced in the past, this does 
not mean we have to ‘throw the baby out with the bathwater’. 
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